UNITED NATIONS
RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

You have heard about this business.  Here is the test of the United Nations calling for the Rapid Deployment Force.  This world class army will eventually come to serve the Prince on Daniel, the Antichrist:

3a. Strengthening the United Nations for its Second Half-Century:
Providing Security from the Scourge of Violence

Historically, the United Nations was intended to deal with conflict between states through a system of collective security, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and, if necessary, enforcement. Disarmament and arms control were also essential parts of the original vision. These functions remain vital to the world organization, but in recent years, such traditional security issues have been widened to include the non-military dimensions of human security and sustainable development. Graphic images of starvation, violence and terrorism, transmitted into living rooms around the world, have stimulated ordinary citizens and their governments to support a new generation of UN actions in many parts of the globe. The result has been a tenfold increase in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in recent years.

This swift expansion, as well as the change in the nature of UN operations, has given rise to serious problems. A large number of simultaneous operations strains the system and absorbs unprecedented amounts of money and personnel. Even more important, the mandates and guidelines for some operations have been inconsistent, and have combined peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian action and post-conflict peace-building in ways that have sometimes proved unworkable. Despite the public demand for such operations, the speedy provision of military forces by Member States for UN operations is often unpredictable, making it difficult for the Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolutions. These weaknesses must be remedied if the public is to have confidence in the UN and its capacity to provide for human security.

Because of these new pressures upon states, security in 1995 and the years beyond has assumed dimensions not foreseen in 1945. While the threat of violence by one country against another has not disappeared, the sources and the manifestations of conflict are changing. Struggles within states involving civil wars, local insurrections or ethnic violence far outnumber those stemming from external aggression or conflict between states. New means are also needed to counter the practice of terrorism. Thus most of the interventions the world organization has recently been asked to undertake have been motivated less by a direct threat to international peace and security than by images of violence so fierce and costly in human terms.

Intra-state conflict forms the primary focus of the "security" section of our Report. It would be unrealistic, however, to assume that international war is a thing of the past, or that the defense departments of UN Member States are persuaded that the only dangers they face in the future arise from new sources of insecurity like social or environmental collapse. We ought to recognize that, should a crisis cause relations between some states to deteriorate, the "human security" provisions recommended here would not be enough. The more traditional security alliances and arrangements will exist alongside international agreements on new means to improve the United Nations' security mechanisms for all types of conflicts.

The new generation of multi-faceted conflicts (with religious, economic, ethnic and territorial disputes interwoven) presents great problems for a United Nations that was created to meet a very different type of security threat. There is considerable political dissension about how the world organization should deal with intra-state conflicts. At the very least, in order to handle these new crises, the UN's intergovernmental organs have to be made more democratic and more representative of the world community than they are today; the mandates of its field operations have to be clarified; and the world organization has to be given the capacity to react quickly and to establish a presence in areas of conflict before the situation gets completely out of control. A number of institutional changes are thus required to help the UN identify the problem, define a solution, and put that solution into effect.

The Security Council: Sustaining Authority and Effectiveness

Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has become a much more active decision-making body, with its members showing increased awareness of their responsibility to maintain peace and of their ability to do so. Nevertheless, its present membership and composition do not reflect the reality of economic and political changes over the past 50 years, still less the fact that the relative position of nations is likely to be even more transformed during the next half-century. The Security Council must become more representative of diverse perspectives if its actions are to command full respect in all parts of the world.

A Security Council of larger membership and different composition should not be hindered in its ability to take action. If more countries possess veto privileges in the Security Council, the UN faces the increased possibility of paralysis should one Permanent Member oppose the great majority of states. This risk would be particularly acute if, as during the Cold War, the veto were to be invoked over a broad range of issues and not just on enforcement measures. We therefore suggest both the expansion of the Permanent Membership and a restriction of the existing veto privilege.

Members of the General Assembly have given extensive consideration to changes in the size of the Security Council without yet reaching consensus, but we recommend the following compromise: the Security Council would be expanded from its present membership of 15 to a total of approximately 23 Members, of whom not more than five would be new Permanent Members. All new Members should be selected with attention to the accepted principles of participation and equity in a universal organization. The new Permanent Members would be chosen also for their ability and will to contribute, according to their capabilities, to peacekeeping and enforcement operations.

At the same time, the veto would be applicable only to peacekeeping and enforcement measures. This would return the UN to the original spirit of the Charter, where the veto was intended mainly to prevent the Security Council from authorizing military action against a Permanent Member or requiring use of its forces against its will. In fact the veto has been invoked over a much wider variety of decisions and resolutions. A change in the use of the veto could be arranged by agreement among the Permanent Members and without Charter amendment, and would be in order even if no alteration is made in the Council s membership. However, if there is an increase in the number of Members accorded veto rights -- necessarily by Charter revision -- as a complementary measure, an amendment restricting the scope of the veto for all Permanent Members would be desirable.

The advantages of these twin changes are clear: the Security Council, when it does decide to intervene, will be speaking for a truly global constituency. The distinction between the Permanent and Non-Permanent Members will not be as large as before. And the veto will no longer be used to delay progress on the wide array of other issues with which the Security Council is concerned.

Early Warning and Threat Assessment

An essential first step toward preparing the United Nations to deal with contemporary challenges would be to establish in the Secretary-General's office an early-warning and threat-assessment section, to provide the Secretary-General and the UN's intergovernmental bodies with better information of impending crises. While the Secretariat has considerably developed its capacity to collect and process data from public sources, it needs access to first-hand reports of internal conflicts and economic, social, and humanitarian crises from governments, field representatives of UN agencies, specialized agencies and non-state actors. Such information should be assembled and assessed by a central office. An effective early-warning system would augment the ability of the Secretary-General and his special representatives for preventive diplomacy, one of the key functions of the Secretary-General's office. It would also provide a reliable basis for alerting the Security Council to possible trouble.

Since many of today's conflicts stem from social or economic causes, the assessment office must develop knowledge of internal economic and social developments as well as of the state of political or international relations. In the context of global development, early warning of growing tensions among ethnic groups will be as pertinent as first-hand information of a likely border dispute. The assessment staff should draw heavily on data and expertise in the various departments of the Secretariat and in the specialized agencies, as well as on analyses of the UN's experience in field operations. It should be in contact with regional organizations, sharing information and advice with them when preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping actions are contemplated. In this way it would work as a global conflict prevention center.

An interdisciplinary analysis and planning staff would serve, and be of value to, the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the other principal organs of the United Nations. It should provide for better coordination among the many parts of the United Nations system by bringing together the security, economic and social elements of human security problems. It should also produce well-thought-out plans for dealing with societies that are collapsing.

We therefore recommend that a Security Assessment Staff, drawn from existing departments and through secondment from functional organizations, be established as part of the Office of the Secretary-General.

Capacity for Action

Better information alone, however, cannot prevent violence. As the recent experience of the UN suggests, the world organization must have better means to meet emergency challenges. The Security Council, aided by the Secretary-General and his staff, must bring greater clarity, coherence, flexibility, and effectiveness to the many actions which it presently oversees and which it is likely to authorize in the future.

The range of actions the Security Council may call for is extensive, running from diplomacy and peacekeeping, through economic sanctions, to full-scale enforcement and collective military operations against a named aggressor. There are some types of conflict which the United Nations is ill-equipped or not designed to handle, apart from offering its impartial good offices. A major war between great powers, or a large-scale civil war, will be beyond the scope of the UN's peacekeeping or enforcement capacity. The focus must be upon those cases where the Security Council has agreed there is a situation calling for a military or non-military response by the United Nations. There must also be a demonstrated willingness to act by Member States, especially those that provide contingents and the bulk of the financial and logistical support for UN operations [ I.E. the USA!!! ]. The instruments and actions which we suggest below are predicated on the assumption both that a UN response is deemed necessary and that Members have the will and determination to carry through the plans they have agreed upon. Failing such will, proposals for improving the UN's security apparatus have little value.

Clarifying the Concepts of UN Military Action

A conceptual re-evaluation of the current confused distinctions between the peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building functions of the United Nations system is badly needed. This re-evaluation has commenced with the Secretary-General's Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in January 1995, and needs to be developed further.

We envisage the UN's peace-building task as belonging primarily in the civilian sphere and taking place after the conflict is concluded; it is therefore discussed later, in the "Social Fabric" section of the Report. It is the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement that concerns us here. United Nations' peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved lightly-armed forces, interposed impartially by agreement between conflicting parties to maintain stability while negotiations to resolve the conflict get under way. In some cases, as in Macedonia, these forces are intended to serve preventively as a symbol of UN concern and a link to a possible UN response to an outbreak of violence. Authorized by the Security Council, the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of the Secretary-General. It is hard to foresee a time when the world organization will not be engaged in this field.

However, traditional peacekeeping methods are not appropriate for those occasions where armed conflict occurs within a state, civil authority is challenged or collapses entirely, and factional struggles for dominance are under way. Given the United Nations' responsibility for maintaining peace, the world organization cannot ignore crises which place in jeopardy entire populations and threaten human security in the broadest sense. It needs consistent and principled guidelines to deal with this recurrent problem.

A first step in this direction was provided by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's document, An Agenda for Peace, which articulated the idea of special "peace-enforcement" contingents, equipped with appropriate armaments and authorized to use them to accomplish their mission. This deployment would be a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, and thus "without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned." In practice, however, the realization of this concept has been seriously affected by three critical difficulties. The first is that, as events in Somalia and Bosnia have shown, it is a mistake to transform a peacekeeping operation into provisional peace-enforcement without the necessary mandate or resources for the task.

The second difficulty is that as soon as peace-enforcement is carried out (even to secure humanitarian aid), one of the parties to the conflict is likely to assert that UN impartiality has been forfeited, and to take action against UN personnel. The role of the Secretary-General as an impartial diplomatic mediator -- a precious resource -- is particularly endangered when provisional peace-enforcement turns into a major operation directed against an enemy.

The third difficulty, the reluctance of Member States to accept the task of enforcing peace, flows from the second. Because an aggrieved party might threaten retaliation against peace-enforcement actions, casualties are more likely and the number of troops and cost of the operation will be much higher than in peacekeeping. Even relatively small, unexpected losses can cause a dramatic public reaction, damaging (albeit unfairly) the UN's image. We cannot stress too strongly that any commitment to peace-enforcement should mean that the Security Council has also resolved to supply the necessary forces -- substantial, adequately armed units -- and the finances to get the job done. Anything less is likely to lead to failure and a loss of confidence in the Organization.

This problem can be resolved only at the political level. When conditions change in a country after an initial UN force deployment, and proposals are made to augment the action originally mandated by the Security Council, Member States and their publics have a right to know what new operations they are being asked to support and what additional risks are entailed. Keeping the mandates distinct is also essential to protect UN personnel and the integrity of their mission. We therefore recommend that, when the Security Council adopts a resolution authorizing the use of military force of any kind, the resolution should clearly state whether that force will be used for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement under Article 40 of the Charter, or collective security action under Article 42. It should be clearly provided that forces acting on behalf of the Council will not exceed the Council's mandate. In addition, any change in the original mandate must be approved by the Security Council and explained to the participating Member States. [ I.E. the US Military has no say or ultimate command of it own troops. ] In particular, the implications of moving from a peacekeeping mission to peace-enforcement should be made crystal clear to all parties involved.

Actions against Aggression

A United Nations response to an act of major aggression (under Chapter VII) would involve a much larger military undertaking than peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. Faced with such a serious challenge to international order, the Security Council will authorize a Member State, or perhaps a regional organization (under Chapter VIII), to implement its decision. While the Council must establish clear guidelines and limits for this sort of mandate, the operation would not be directly under UN command but under a field commander designated by the country or organization charged with carrying out the Council resolution. If, however, sufficient troops were to be made available by Member States themselves to deploy an adequate force for Article 42 enforcement under UN command, the Security Council should establish an ad hoc military authority for each operation, comprising representatives of the parties involved in the operation. The authority would be responsible for strategy and liaison with the UN field commander, and might be mandated to name the field commander, who would have operational control of the forces. The Security Council itself would retain ultimate authority in defining the mission objectives and the terms of peace. It should keep the situation under continuing review so as to insure that the conduct of the operation is in conformity with the objectives and terms laid down by the Council.

Rapid Response Capability

The United Nations needs the capability to respond quickly in situations of conflict, including those where civil authority collapses and violence breaks out threatening a massive loss of life and an interruption of humanitarian assistance. Slowness to act may lead to enormous cost and casualties, as was the case in Rwanda. The United Nations needs to have a reliable and immediately available, well trained and adequately equipped rapid response force to deploy quickly in such circumstances. We accordingly recommend that a UN Rapid Reaction Force be established for urgent deployment on the decision of the Security Council.

The initial target figure for such a force might be 10,000. The mixture of military, police and civilian elements will need careful study in the context of the duties to be performed, as will its mode of operation. It should consist of well-trained and highly competent personnel drawn from different regions of the world. The force would be mandated to perform such functions as the following: establish a UN presence; provide security for UN personnel; hold an airport for use in bringing in supplies and additional UN personnel or for evacuations; establish one or more safe areas for the civilian population; limit escalation and assist in ending the violence; provide limited humanitarian assistance in emergency circumstances; assess and report on the situation to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

A Rapid Reaction Force would operate in conformity with the provisions of Article 40 of the UN Charter, that is, without prejudice to the rights or position of any of the parties. It would be replaced as soon as feasible by regular peacekeeping or peace-enforcement troops provided by Member States, for which it would in no way be a substitute. The Force would have a permanent command and control staff, operating during deployment under the day-to-day direction of the Secretary-General.

To meet the requirements of quick availability, common training and compatible equipment, the Force could best consist of volunteers, recruited by the UN and stationed and trained in UN camps or centers. Deployment would be subject only to the decision of the Security Council.

This is an ambitious innovation, and we realize that there is likely to be opposition to it for a variety of reasons: political, financial, and military. On the other hand, there is at present a damaging gap in the UN's performance both in time (between a Security Council decision and the practical measures to implement it) and in function (in the capacity of the UN to put an effective presence on the ground before the situation gets totally out of hand). Ideally, the Rapid Reaction Force suggested could fill this gap, and it should be the ultimate objective.

The United States was founded on rebellion against a king, and it will be destroyed by rebellion against the king-- King Clinton (or whoever follows him).  The blood bath will be awful, and the United States will rapidly fall into the backwater of world influence with England.  I am sorry, groupies, but the prophetic Word of God does NOT allow for the USA to be Babylon, nor for it to last much longer.  The world center is soon to be Jerusalem and literal Babylon.  The world economic center is NOT Wall Street-- It is Europe-- Rome restored.

The future is not rosy from a worldly point of view, but  we have great hope nonetheless, as we read in Psalms 91:1 He that dwelleth in the secret place of the most High shall abide under the shadow of the Almighty. 

As for the United Nations Army, it IS predicted in:

Daniel 11:31 And arms shall stand on his (Antichrist's) part, and they shall pollute the sanctuary of strength (Jerusalem), and shall take away the daily sacrifice, and they shall place the abomination that maketh desolate.

January, 1997:  Be preparred to hear UN General Sec. Kofi Annan call for a UN standing army soon.  The USA wants to be the cop of the world.  The struggle for control of the world military unit could cause the UN to soon move to Europe.  The result would be the subjection of the US Military to the UN.

May 6, 1996:  We have a report from Juha Ikalainen in Finland that EC tropps are stationed in Finland and all the EC countires on "standby." For what? Juha reports that these troops are ready to attack, and Bible believers in Finland assume they will be used to attack Israel in the Tribulation.  It looks a bit different when you get closer.  We in the USA better be making friends in Europe if we are going to understand the times in which we live.

August 4,1997

Seoul, South Korea

A Report From a POW and MIA page.

In a goodwill gesture on the eve of landmark four-nation talks, famine-threaten North Korea Monday handed over the remains of four U.S. soldiers killed during the 1950-1953 Korean War.

The move was followed by a rare series of concillatory steps on the tense Korean peninsula, the last flashpoint of the Cold War.

Rivals North and South Korea(Sounds like a football game) linked up their public telephone lines for the first time since the peninsula was divided at the end of World War II. (Anyone have a clue as to brokered that deal?)the Red Cross of the south announced food supplies to the North and Pyongyang allowed a group of Western journalists to enter the reclusive state.

The goodwill gesture came as the two Koreas, the United States and China prepared for a meeting Tuesday in New York to set a date, venue and adgenda for their peace talks.........

Drenched by rain, U.S. Honor Guards draped the caskets in U.N. flags...

The above Webmaster then drops the flow and says,  "Sorry folks, I can not continue transcribing this garbage! You get the drift!! These men died nearly fifty years ago and are only coming home because of North KoreasGOODWILLWill it be another fifty years when North Vietnam decides to return our MIA/POW's as a gesture of Goodwill ?

As to the caskets being draped in U.N. flags..  Whoever gave that order should be Court Martialed! These four men did not join the United Nations - they were United States of America fighting men! They fought and died for our flag.. the least we could do is honor them with it.

I intend to find out who gave that order and I encourage you to make inquiries of you elected officials also."

Balaam's Ass Speaks also calls for the Court Martial of those who gave the order to drape that casket in UN flags.  Napoleon said, "If you are given an order which is not moral, you must disobey the order and take the consequences."  We are tired of wimps who don't know what an immoral order is.

LINK:  Read more about POWs and MIAs.  http://www.cyberhighway.net/~hoot/sitrep.html

The hand over of the above prisoners is plenty of vindication of those who claim that there are still POWs alive in Korea and Viet Nam.  Where is the scurvy wimp in the White House who ran to Oxford while these men were fighting?  Where are these Senators who blow off at the mouth about loving America?  America is walking up and down in a compound in Southeast Asia... having to assume that we don't care.  All young men who consider joining the Armed Forces of the USA must realize that they are expendable trash to the leaders of this country.  Beware.

December  1998

Discussion of the US soldier and the oath he takes with regard to US forces

Which side are you on: America's or the internationalists'?
Published in The Orlando Sentinel, Dec 24 1998
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/122498_REESE24.html

By Charley Reese Commentary

The oath United Nations officers must take and the one American soldiers take proves that Michael New, the only American ever tried and convicted by court-martial for wanting to serve his country in uniform, was dead right.

New -- a young, enlisted man -- refused to don U.N. insignia and serve in Macedonia under the command of a Finnish officer. He believes that his oath forbids it, and for that he was court-martialed. His appeal is still winding its way through the courts.

But let's look at the oaths. An American soldier swears as follows:

"I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the president of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice."

Now, here is the oath that officers serving the United Nations must take:

"I solemnly affirm to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as a member of the international service of the United Nations, to discharge those functions and regulate my conduct with the interest of the United Nations only in view and not to seek or accept instructions in respect to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the organization." The emphasis is mine.

As you can plainly see, a person cannot be loyal to both the United States and to the United Nations. The United Nations is a separate, foreign government. And that was Michael New's point: He never took an oath to the United Nations, and no one had the authority to place him under foreign command.

It bears remembering that, when American troops arrived in France during World War I, British and French officials proposed that they be integrated into the Allied forces and serve under British and French command. Gen. Blackjack Pershing flatly refused. No American soldier, he said, would serve under a foreign commander.

This is an issue that all Americans should join, for it is much larger than Michael New. The question is, do we want America to retain its sovereignty and independence for which our ancestors fought a war with Great Britain, or do we wish it to become a non-independent part of an international, sovereign government?

Yes or no.

And you had better decide, because the American Establishment is opting gradually to dissolve American independence and to merge it into an international order. To prepare Americans for that loss of independence, the present administration is ordering American troops to serve under U.N. command, doing U.N. errands. American troops are posted in more than 100 foreign countries, in nearly every case as U.N. errand boys or U.N. leg-breakers.

In a speech urging rejection of the League of Nations, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge said, "It must be made perfectly clear that no American soldiers, not even a corporal's guard, that no American sailors, not even the crew of a submarine, can ever be engaged in war or ordered anywhere except by the constitutional authorities of the United States. To Congress is granted by the Constitution the right to declare war, and nothing that would take troops out of the country at the bidding or demand of other nations should ever be permitted . . . ."

As you can see, the fight for American sovereignty is a continuing fight. Which side are you on: America's or the internationalists'? Do you have the courage of Michael New to stand by your country?

The shape of the future depends on the answers.

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