- TABLE OF CONTENTS
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STUDY - MORAL
ISSUES - KING
JAMES BIBLE - CULTS
I have two articles for you on this topic. Nothing else needs to be said. I have no idea what to do about this one. It may well be that we are all going to see the whole world regress to a very basic state due to the folly of health officials who thought they were gods. They destroyed the vast bulk of the surplus smallpox vaccine, so there is no hope. If you think this could be bad on your heart of blood pressure, I suggest you back out of this page and forget it.
May 21, 2002-- This article was written about a two years BEFORE the World Trade Center was attacked. I feel I must put these articles back up on the journal. I believe I have a better than average ability to understand the Muslim and Arab mind, so I have a responsibility to tell you how I see it
A chilling scenario of possible national collapse was presented Monday to US lawmakers by a group of prominent security experts, who warned that a biological terrorist attack on US soil could bring the country to the brink of disintegration.
The panel, which included former deputy secretary of defense John Hamre, Oklahoma governor Frank Keating and former senator Sam Nunn, presented their conclusions after holding a two-day exercise code-named "Dark Winter," which featured a computer-simulated bioterrorist attack on three US states.
Members of the House Subcommittee on National Security closely listened as participants painted a picture of the world's most powerful nation descending into chaos in a matter of several weeks.
The game starts with a brief television report that about two dozen people checked into an Oklahoma City hospital with an unidentified illness. Doctors soon find the patients have smallpox, a highly contagious and deadly disease unseen in the United States since 1949.
Similar smallpox cases are reported in Pennsylvania and Georgia. By day six, 300 Americans are dead and 2,000 others are infected. Cases of smallpox are reported in Mexico, Canada and Britain, according to the scenario.
Meanwhile the US heath system is overwhelmed, the 12 million doses of smallpox vaccine quickly disappear, schools nationwide are forced to close, and public gatherings are limited due to fear of contagion.
Droves of Oklahomans anxious to flee stream toward Texas -- but the Texas governor, eager to protect his own residents, closes the border and deploys the state National Guard. Shots are fired.
As the standoff between Texans and Oklahomans deepens, a rift opens between federal and local authorities. Members of the US National Security Council suggest "nationalizing" the national guard, while state governors insist on keeping the local troops under their control.
On day 12 of the scenario, when the death toll reaches 1,000, interstate commerce grinds to a halt and stock trading is suspended. Demonstrations demanding more smallpox vaccines turn into riots. The United Nations moves its headquarters from New York to Geneva, Switzerland.
Less than two months after the outbreak, when the number of dead reach one million and three million more are infected, the president, played in the exercise by Nunn, gathers his top aide to considers imposing marshal law.
Dead silence reigned in the hearing room as Hamre and Nunn presented their findings with the help of colorful "emergency newscasts" prepared by the nation's leading television broadcasters, who also took part in the exercise, which took place at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, D.C. in June.
"I think we felt it would cripple the United States if it occurred," Hamre said.
"We though we were really gathering together to talk about the mechanics of government," Hamre said. "What we ended up doing is thinking how we save democracy in America."
To Republican Congressman Benjamin Gilman, scenarios like this no longer belong to the realm of science fiction.
"Sadly, events of the last few years, with bombings ... in New York, Oklahoma City, have transformed the bioterrorism debate from the question of 'if' to the seeming inevitability of 'when," he said.
Nunn, who had sat on the Senate Armed Services Committee for more than two decades, said the exercise raised more questions than answers.
If there is only one dose of smallpox vaccine for every 23 Americans, whom do you vaccinate? he asked.
"Do you seize hotels and convert them to hospitals? Do you close borders and block all travel? What level of force do you use to keep someone sick with smallpox in isolation?" he asked.
No clear answer was offered by those present.
willingness of terrorist groups to employ weapons against the United States was
alarmingly demonstrated by the World Trade Center bombing, in which the stated
goal of the terrorists was to maximize civilian casualties. But the use of conventional
weapons to terrorize a civilian population is not the only cause for concern.
Health professionals should be acquainted with diseases that lend themselves to
bioterrorism. The possibility of a biological attack against one or more American
cities is a major concern. Should such an attack occur, medical professionals
are the nation's first line of defense. The quickness with which they diagnose
and respond to a bioterrorist outbreak could decide whether or not the U.S. suffers
The two most threatening diseases associated with bioterrorism are smallpox and anthrax. Despite widespread assurances that smallpox is not longer a threat, there is overwhelming evidence that contaband samples of the virus remain stored in several laboratories throughout the world. That so little attention has been devoted to the possible emergence of a deliberately induced smallpox epidemic is evidence of poor planning as well as governmental irresponsibility.
History of Smallpox
The smallpox virus probably
existed since the infancy of the human species, but required the population density
that can be supported by agriculture to spread quickly. The first historical record
of smallpox infection occurred about 3000 years ago in Egypt. Since then massive
smallpox epidemics have swept across Asia and Europe killing and disfiguring hundreds
of millions. Its contagiousness and explosive infection rate allows the virus
to spread rapidly . Smallpox is unique to humans and is believed to have killed
more people than any other disease in recorded history.(1)
Egypt. The oldest known case of smallpox was that of Pharaoh Ramses V of Egypt who died in the twelfth century BC. His mummy reveals that the young king's face and torso were covered with blisters characteristic of smallpox.(2)
Rome. In 165 A.D. the Roman empire was devastated by a smallpox epidemic that raged for fifteen years and killed tens of millions. Romans were completely vulnerable to smallpox, the disease having suddenly emerged from the Asian continent. The decline in population reduced the Roman army which replaced its losses with barbarians who had no particular loyalty to Rome. Rome was never able to recover its former military prowess, and was eventually over-run by barbarian armies.(3)
Europe and Asia. The middle-ages saw devastating outbreaks of smallpox that killed untold millions throughout Europe and Asia leaving many of the survivors immune.
It was not uncommon for victims of smallpox or some other plague to be catapulted over the walls of a city under siege in an attempt to start an epidemic within it.
Mexico. Cortez and his conquistadors invaded Mexico in 1518. The Aztecs had no immunity to a host of European diseases, the worst being smallpox. By the time Cortez and a few hundred of his exhausted warriors attacked Mexico City with its huge population, the defenders had been decimated and demoralized by smallpox. The city fell, and Aztec civilization fell with it.(4)
North America. It is estimated that smallpox, along with a number of lesser diseases, killed 56 million native Americans during the Spanish conquest of Mexico. The death toll mounted as smallpox spread to other Indian nations, none of which had any resistance to infection. Infected blankets from smallpox victims were presented to native Americans as gifts during the westward expansion of the United States.
Smallpox eradication campaign. In 1952, after the disease had killed about 300 million people in the twentieth century (5), a campaign to eradicate smallpox was initiated by the World Health Organization. The Smallpox Eradication Unit was led by Dr. Donald A. Henderson, a particularly capable epidemiologist. The disease existed in thirty-three countries and was killing more than two-million people per year. A program of mass inoculation was instituted over a twenty year period. Eighty percent of the population was inoculated in regions harboring the disease, and the number of new smallpox cases approached zero.
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had one of the last serious epidemics in 1972. A Muslim pilgrim returned from Mecca to his home in Kosovo carrying the deadly virus. No case had occurred in Yugoslavia since 1930, and the entire population of Yugoslavia had been routinely vaccinated for the past 50 years. The pilgrim himself was inoculated just two months earlier. Yugoslavia had, at the time, eighteen million doses of vaccine available to serve 21 million people. The World Health Organization of the United Nations had millions more. Yugoslavia had an authoritarian government under Tito which was capable of acting swiftly, and if need be, ruthlessly.
The pilgrim felt achy with flu-like symptoms shortly after his return from Mecca. For over a week he had been exposing his family to infection. His first serious symptom was hemorrhaging in the whites of his eyes, which darkened until they were almost black. The development of lesions on his body did not immediately alert anyone to the possibility of smallpox, since no case had occurred in Yugoslavia for over forty
After the onset of severe hemorrhaging, the pilgrim was rushed to a local hospital where he infected a nurse and eight other patients. From the local hospital he was rushed to a hospital in Belgrade where he infected twenty-eight more people including eight doctors and nurses. They in turn in infected 150 more. The disease was moving rapidly throughout Yugoslavia.
The army was mobilized and martial law was declared. The borders were sealed and unauthorized travel was forbidden. Hotels and apartment houses were requisitioned and used to quarantine over ten thousand people. Within two weeks everyone in Yugoslavia had been revaccinated. The number of newly infected individuals dropped with each wave soon reaching zero.(6)
Bangladesh. In early 1975 smallpox broke out in Bangladesh and swept through more than five-hundred villages. Dr. Henderson and his team vaccinated people in rings around each new outbreak, and tracked down everyone who had contact with infected individuals. By the end of the year there were no new cases.(7)
The last known case in the world occurred in Somalia in 1977.(8)
Epidemiology of Smallpox
is among the least pleasant diseases known to man.
It is an explosively contagious viral infection that is unique to humans. It is classified as a hot agent in Biosafety Level 4 category, which means that a single case, anywhere in the world, would be considered a global medical emergency.(1) If smallpox infection is suspected, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Emergency Response Office should be immediately notified.
The Bioterrorism Emergency Number is (770) 488-7100.
Outbreak. In the event of an outbreak of even a single case of smallpox, emergency powers are immediatelt assumed by local, state, and federal authorities according to a chain of command and division of responsibilities. CDC personnel will rush to the scene with protective gear, vaccine, and whatever equipment is needed to collect samples. Specimen packaging and transporting includes a documented chain of possession coordinated by the FBI. Biosafety Level 4 disease specimens are rushed to CDC or several select Department of Defense (DOD) laboratories.(9) Travel may be restricted and quarantines imposed. Civil liberties and constitutional rights tend to fare badly during national emergencies of this gravity.
Epidemic outbreak. Smallpox epidemics develop in waves, with peaks and troughs separated by two-week intervals that correspond to the average incubation period of the virus. The virulence of the epidemic is a function of non-immune population density. Immunized people stifle the epidemic by lowering the average number of transmissions per infected individual. In an unvaccinated population, one infected person can infect all non-immune people with whom he comes in contact. Immunized people in an epidemic are analogous to control rods in nuclear reactors - they slow down and stifle chain-reactions.
Precautions. The U.S. Navy's Bioterrorism Task force specifies the use of masks, gowns, gloves, with thorough washing after each exposure, and the isolation of smallpox patients, preferably in negative pressure rooms. Face masks must be worn when entering the patient�s room. Airborne precautions should be followed. Smallpox is transmitted by particles of five microns or less. They can remain suspended near the patient, or move considerable distances in air currents.
Contact precautions include use of clean gloves on entry into a patient's room, removing gown before leaving room, washing hands and exposed surfaces with antimicrobial soap, and air exchange every 6 to 12 hours through monitored high-efficiency filters.(10)
For prophylactic and post-exposure immunization, smallpox vaccine should be administered to everyone in contact with infected individuals. If more than three days have elapsed since exposure, smallpox vaccine should be administered in conjunction with vaccinia-immune globulin (VIG) ) (0.6l/kg 1M).(11)
(this, of course, assumes that such supplies exist).
Exposed individuals should be on the alert for flue-like symptoms and rashes for 7 to 17 days after exposure. Isolating smallpox patients, individually when possible or in groups when not possible, is essential.
The Smallpox Virus (Variola)
Variola, the causative agent in smallpox, is a large virus with a complex structure that belongs to a class of pox viruses called Chordopoxviridae. It has a somewhat brick-like shape with rounded corners and a knobby surface looking much like the surface of a hand-grenade. (Figure 1) By dry weight variola contains 90% protein, 5% lipid, and 3.2% DNA. Its double-stranded DNA consists of over 190,000 nucleotide base pairs built from over 100 proteins. Its dimensions are about 250 x 250 x 200 nm, large enough to be seen with an optical microscope.(12)gure I: The variola virus
Variola replicates in the cytoplasm of the host cell independent of the host cell enzymes. The virus rapidly multiplies until the cell bursts, releasing tens of thousands of variolas capable of attacking other host cells. The replication cycle is repeated every few hours and by the time the victim shows symptoms, he is awash in quadrillions of variolas.
Identification. Confirmation of the presence of the variola virus is carried out by examination of fluid from an active lesion. Active skin lesions are characterized by altered epidermal cells containing eosinophilic intracytoplasmic bodies (Guarneri bodies). Further confirmation is carried out using immunofluorescence and microscopy. The distinctive shape and size of variola (it is the largest known virus) should make a diagnosis definitive.
Mechanism of Infection
infection. To sustain itself, the smallpox virus is
passed from person to person in a continuing and expanding chain of infection.
It is spread primarily by the inhalation of airborne droplets, and secondarily
by physical contact. A single invisible droplet of exhalant travels in still air
about ten feet from its human source, and contains far more viruses than is needed
to infect a single individual.(13)
Variola major. There are two variants of the smallpox virus: variola major which is the more lethal variant, and variola minor which is a weak mutant. We will only deal wih variola major. There is enough variation in the disease progression that smallpox may not be recognized even by doctors familiar with the disease of whom there are virtually none.
Onset. During a typical incubation period of ten to fifteen days the infected person will feel normal, but is already contagious. The first signs of the onset of the disease are severe flu-like symptoms, headache and fever. In another three or four days, tiny red dots appear over the entire body. The spots develop, in order of progression, from macules to papules to vesicles to pustules. An identifying characteristic of smallpox is its foul and distinctive odor arising from the victim's pustules, which once smelled is never forgotten.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
The second day of the symposium featured a discussion of a scenario in which a medium-sized American city is attacked with smallpox. Four panels represented various time milestones after the attack, from a few weeks to several months. Panelists discussed what they and their colleagues might be doing at each of these milestones. The goal of the responses was to communicate the complexity of the issues and to explore the diverse problems that might arise beyond the care and treatment of patients.
The scenario itself was a step-by-step account of a smallpox epidemic in the fictional city of Northeast. Tara O'Toole, the scenario's lead author, read the narrative account before each panel.
The panelists responded to the events as if the epidemic were real and they were actually trying to identify, contain, communicate, and otherwise deal with it. Panel members included experts on hospital, city, state, federal, and media responses. Representing the hospitals were John Bartlett and Trish Perl, Johns Hopkins Hospital; Julie Gerberding, Hospital Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and Gregory Moran, Emergency Medicine, University of California at Los Angeles. Jerome Hauer represented New York City's response. Representing the state were Michael Ascher, California Department of Health Services Laboratory; Arne Carlson, former governor of Minnesota; Terry O'Brien, a Minnesota State Assistant Attorney General; and Michael Osterholm, Minnesota Department of Public Health. The federal representatives on the panels were Robert Blitzer, former counterterrorism chief with the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Robert DeMartino, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration; Robert Knouss, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services; and Scott Lillibridge, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Joanne Rodgers, Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions Public Affairs, spoke to the response of the media. George Strait, the medical news director for ABC News, acted as moderator for each of the panels scheduled on day two. D.A. Henderson also helped to moderate.
At the start of the epidemic, 2 weeks after the bioterrorist attack, confusion reigns. There is uncertainty as to what the infection is and reluctance to diagnose smallpox even when it is suspected. It is unclear who is in charge of investigating and containing the epidemic. Outside, reporters are knocking on the hospital doors. The question of what took so long to identify the agent opens the panel. Smallpox, a nonspecific flulike illness, is hard to diagnose, replies an emergency medicine physician. The disease is not suspected because it was eradicated in the late 1970s. Any laboratory work on the first cases would initially be testing for a battery of other causes, such as other viral infections (e.g., monkeypox) or reactions to recent vaccinations. A window of 2 weeks before positive identification of smallpox may even be optimistic. The diagnosis would probably take much longer because of physicians' lack of familiarity with the disease.
When all the tests for other infections turn up negative and smallpox is strongly suspected, suggests a state laboratory chief, a conclusive result from the laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) would still be needed. These are the only two places in the United States equipped to identify smallpox virus in tissue samples. This part of the diagnosis is fairly straightforward but it would take at least 1 day before the definitive results could be obtained.
Hospitals would probably isolate the early cases presumptively, even if smallpox was not suspected, since the symptoms would appear infectious. This is the opinion of a hospital infections expert. In the city, argues a state health department professional, several hospitals would each see one or two of the first few cases. The city health department would quickly become aware of the similarity of the cases in the various hospitals, recognize a potential outbreak (probably measles) and mobilize early to contain it.
Once smallpox is identified, the following organizations within city government would be notified: the police department, the local emergency management office, the city health commissioner's office, and, ultimately, the mayor's office. This process may be difficult since it requires integrating the health department into emergency management plans, an event with little precedent, notes a city emergency official.
Who is in charge, agree panelists, is one of the most important questions yearly in the epidemic, because any large-scale relief effort would require good management. Complicating the answer, however, are various levels of government, each with its own responsibilities and perspective on response, as reflected in panelists' remarks.
Acts of domestic terrorism are under the jurisdiction of the federal government, so several federal agencies become involved, starting with FBI. FBI is involved from the very beginning since any cases of smallpox would indicate a deliberate terrorist attack. A criminal investigation begins immediately. CDC is involved as soon as samples are sent for laboratory diagnosis.
The state government becomes involved at the outset, since major threats to public health are dealt with on the state level. The state health department starts its own investigation, and to reassure the public, the governor may act as a spokesperson for the management of the epidemic.
The city is involved from the outset, explains the city emergency management official, understanding that "bioterrorism is a local issue," which escalates very rapidly to state and federal levels. The local police and emergency management teams, as well as the city health commissioner, the city health department, and the mayor, are involved.
The problems of the city become state problems immediately, counters the former governor, because the news media treat any potential infectious disease outbreak as a regional problem. This forces the governor's hand. The governor has to move in because there is a need for one person to be in charge.
The most difficult situation is how to deal with the hospital patients. One danger in the early days is losing control of the crisis through panic. Once rumors about smallpox start to spread, many workers within the hospital walk off the job. Understaffing also leads to increased stress and confusion for patients and providers alike.
Even before federal and state command structures are in place, suggests a hospital infections control expert, hospital epidemiologists would already be addressing infection control issues. She notes that hospital infection control specialists would be on the phone to colleagues in other city hospitals alerting one another. Hospital epidemiologists, adds a state health official, would have a contact list of state, local, and federal public-health authorities who also would be notified.
Another problem in coordination becomes clear to panelists: the difficulty in sharing classified risk information among agencies and various levels of government. Any early warning, which could have contributed to a more effective response, was missing in the scenario. Even though the FBI had some early intelligence of the attack, the alerting of health care workers was nonexistent. The problem lies in the fact, assesses a state health department official, that health departments have never been seen as intelligence communities, nor has there ever been a precedent for passing such information to them.
On the federal level, CDC addresses the public health issues of the epidemic, and FBI addresses the law enforcement issues. These aims are not necessarily exclusive of one another, and the possibility of linking efforts is raised. Everyone interviewed as a part of the epidemiologic investigation may have to be interviewed as part of the criminal investigation as well. Perhaps the most effective way to accomplish this is to conduct both interviews simultaneously.
Some aspects of the two federal agencies may overlap, perhaps even conflict, in agendas. Specimens that are sent to CDC for positive identification of the smallpox virus may be needed by FBI as evidence for any eventual prosecution. In many ways, it may appear as if FBI is running the investigation. However, dealing with the sick, obtaining vaccine, and mobilizing the epidemiologic investigation at the local, state, and federal levels are outside the scope of FBI. CDC takes the lead on these public health issues, and together with FBI, coordinates the management of federal resources.
However, who is coordinating activities at the hospitals is still unclear, and the question of authority on that level is unresolved. Can outsiders come into a hospital and wield power, and if so, who are they? Federal responders may have ambiguous authority within a hospital and may add to the chaos. An FBI offical notes that his agency's role in the hospitals will simply be to inform the doctors and administrators of what the hospital needs to do to assist in the criminal investigationkeeping evidence and coordinating interviews with patients. However, this may still leave gaps of authority within the hospital.
In the scenario under consideration, the state identifies one hospital as the smallpox hospital, and this also presents a problem of coordination. The hospital itself has to work out the details of local quarantine and the distribution of medicine to the patients, and there is a need to protect the health-care workers and other hospital staff. Vaccine should be immediately available to these workers, and its distribution will have to be coordinated with CDC.
Outside the hospitals, an epidemiologic investigation will be taking place that will need to be coordinated with CDC. A CDC official points out the need for surveillance in the early days of the epidemic. To assist in collecting data necessary to identify the release source and people at risk, he recommends that CDC provide additional staff for much of the epidemiologic work, including mid- and senior-level investigators. Bringing in these outside experts should not represent a problem for local officials, he suggests, since CDC already has strong ties with state epidemiologists.
How to control the message going to the public weighs heavily upon the minds of all panelists. Reporters on the hospital scene will quickly become aware of any rumors and will demand answers of any worker or official who is handy. Official channels will not be the only source of information during the epidemic, argues the public affairs specialist.
First responders, such as the police or fire officials, might show up with full biohazard protection; such an image immediately raises questions. The media will digest information from day one, whether or not there is an official statement from the city, state, or federal level.
Controlling the message that goes out over the airwaves could be extremely difficult, especially since there may not even be any consensus on what the message should be in the first place. Several panelists point out the need to ensure that information presented to the media is consistent and credible. The city emergency manager suggests that the mayor will work with federal and state officials to get consistent and credible information out to the public. One viable alternative to speculation and misinformation, proposes an FBI official, is to have a centralized joint information center, such as the one his agency set up in Oklahoma City after the bombing, with several experts answering all the questions that arise.
Regardless of how information is disseminated, the message must be carefully considered. If the flulike symptoms of smallpox are identified on the evening news, a flood of noninfected persons with stuffy noses or headaches could swell emergency rooms across the state. Other reports, such as upcoming quarantine efforts, may also spread panic and should be handled carefully. The types of stories the media choose to write present a challenge. The press will not only cover the crisis but the managers of the crisis. Plans for responding to questions about crisis management must be in place. Whether or not the message that goes out to the public includes mention of terrorism should be weighed.
The hospital infections expert pursues a different angle to the issue of information exchange. The difficulties in interviewing the public have not been solved, she points out. Who will do the interviews? How they will be coordinated with criminal investigations? Who will receive vaccine? And how will health-care workers be protected? Will the system be overwhelmed by false casespeople who think they have smallpox? Moreover, a basic problem in the early days of the epidemic is the need for an infrastructure to handle the large volume of calls flooding the hospitals.
What will be the plan of action? Hundreds of people will have to be mobilized to interview the public, and hundreds more will be needed to administer vaccine. The distribution of antibiotics and vaccines represents a logistical problem that must be overcome.
As the epidemic grows and spreads to several states, friction between the levels of government grows. Governors are demanding vaccine supplies, fueling a larger debate of how vaccination should be handled. Tens of thousands of people are vaccinated, but many more still need vaccine. Media reports begin to be critical of the government's handling of the crisis.
What still needs to be done? With a growing number of deaths, the rise in the number of patients in quarantine, the loss of critical health-care workers and city emergency workers, within the city things are beginning to get out of focus, notes a city official. Asking how leadership will function inside the hospital, the hospital epidemiologist identifies a need for official responses that are well thought out, strong, and based on hard science.
The vaccine campaign poses significant issues. The limited supply of vaccine must be divided up and distributed according to greatest riskpersons who may have been infected or who care for those infected, argues an official in federal emergency management. Political leaders and essential city workers are other priority groups. A consensus must be reached as to how to proceed with the vaccinations. CDC is best suited to coordinate vaccine efforts, but the public health community must work towards an emergency. The governor, warns the city emergency manager, may step in and call the shots. There is a need for a public health emergency plan. Did the outbreak start from a single source or from multiple sources? This determination would help with vaccine management and allocation, but there is no answer. Moreover, testing facilities at CDC and USAMRIID are overwhelmed at this point in the epidemic.
Hospitals must deal with quarantine. Restrictions are imposed in the first days or weeks of an epidemic. Workers' fear of being sequestered causes them to leave hospitals understaffed. Many people are likely to stay at their posts if they feel they have reliable information and support, argues a mental health provider. Some, however, may leave the front lines to go home to their own families.
According to a 1905 Massachusetts case, cites a state's assistant attorney general, compulsory vaccinations are not a violation of due process and are therefore legal. So the local, state, and federal levels of government have no obstacle to vaccinating those designated at risk.
A more difficult legal question is that of quarantining smallpox patients. Many of the public health codes used to allocate powers to government officials are old and may not be valid or useful. Also, court precedents from HIV cases may have heavily weighted matters in favor of due process. Minnesota, for example, requires a separate court hearing for each case of quarantine. Thus, quarantine may be possible in a hospital but not in the community.
How Boston Beat a Smallpox Epidemic
Boston Globe (www.boston.com/globe) (02/02/01) P. A3; Saltus, Richard.
A National Institutes of Health study, published in the New England Journal of Medicine, suggests that the escalating rate of infectious disease can be combated if communities emulate some of the practices Boston used to defeat a smallpox epidemic in 1901. All Bostonians infected with smallpox were quarantined in designated facilities, while teams of police officers and doctors vaccinated all healthy people. The reason the effort was so successful was because "virus squads" went as far as inoculating homeless people against their will. The researchers recommend that initiatives be made to reach people with the highest probability of being disease carriers without trampling on individual rights.
So, without vaccine, and without the will to quarantine, we are dead as a nation from the second the vials of smallpox are dropped from the top of Empire State Building. Epidemiologically speaking, the USA, and the rest of the world for that matter, is a virgin for smallpox. There are NO people, world wide, under the age of 30, who have smallpox immunity. Smallpox vaccination is effective for about ten years. The last vaccination was given in 1973 in Bangladesh and Ethiopia.
The American people virtually do not remember what the word "quarantine" means. Jerry Brown refused to spray the crops in California for the Med Fly in about 1980 because the idiot didn't want to spray his space cadet voting constituency who were rabid greens. The Med Fly infestation got so bad that it was virtually out of control. Jerry Brown was told to kiss $3 billion of agri-trade goodbye if he waited to spray. Brown then over-reacted and sprayed everything in California. This is how our Liberals and Bushites will respond to the need to quarantine. Once they realize America is doomed and collapsing, they will herd millions of people into concentration camp facilities to protect the uninfected.
The day smallpox is found in the USA, mark it down-- Fully one third of the US population will be wiped out. This will mean total collapse of life as we know it today, and the US will go into total economic collapse. The only precautions will be those you took BEFORE the epidemic. What are the chances of an epidemic? Well, tell me, what are the chances of a mail bomber? What are the chances of a kook blowing up the Federal Building in Oklahoma City? What are the chances of a Charles Manson? What are the chances of a Vietnam Vet machine gunning a McDonalds? Now, we move on to Libya, Iraq, Osama Bin Laden, Hamas, Hizb'ullah, North Korea, Fidel Castro. Then, we move on to the potential of aging bio warfare bunkers in Russia simply popping open from old age.
And, lastly, we have to ask, "Do we believe the World Health Organization, which was managed by a former SS officer during the vaccination program, is believable when they claim smallpox is eradicated?" I do not believe they are God, and I do not believe the virus is 100% gone.
Another basic legal question is whether the lines of legal support are clear to all officials, such as hospital guards and police officers. How far can police go to detain quarantined patients? The limits of emergency powers should be clearly delineated in any predisaster planning.
The epidemic is threatening to expand beyond the city into the rest of the country and even beyond. The World Health Organization (WHO) will probably become involved, and travel notifications have to be introduced.
Even without adequate supplies of vaccine, much can be done with the existing stocks. Prevaccinating some health-care workers is a proactive approach. Having a sizable pool of prevaccinated professionals who can mobilize and act as emergency responders takes much of the pressure off local hospitals. One way to reduce secondary transmission (outside of vaccinating the contacts of the infected person), instructs the hospital epidemiologist, is good infection controlwearing filter masks and washing hands well. Another way of controlling the epidemic is through quarantine. While these measures are not a substitute for adequate vaccine supply, they can slow the epidemic.
One problem with the vaccine supply is that many more people want to be vaccinated than limited stores permit. There are not even enough stores of vaccine to prevent the spread of the epidemic. The existing 6 to 7 million doses of smallpox vaccine will not last forever, and the 36 months it takes for additional large-scale preparations is prohibitive, argues a vaccine campaign expert. Health officials will likely not have the time or resources to target precisely those people who have an actual need for vaccine. The need for vaccine will overwhelm the supply.
The cost of vaccine development may inhibit stockpiling, proposes a CDC official. Since an attack with smallpox is of low probability, large-scale production may be difficult to justify. A partnership between private industry and the government would help, however. Also, the cost of getting caught without an adequate supply could be disastrous.
Possible emergency measures to stretch the vaccine supply, proposes a smallpox expert, include arm-to-arm vaccination as pustules form on the arms of vaccinated people; vaccinia could be grown in massive amounts in tissue culture; and 30 million doses of vaccine could be contracted from South Africa.
The smallpox epidemic has become a major public health emergency affecting several cities in many states and at least four other countries. The event is identified as a terrorist attack, because no other source of smallpox outside a deliberate release exists. For those who have already contracted smallpox, antiviral drugs, such as cydolfivir, may be useful but these medicines may be just as scarce as the vaccines.
Secondary transmission got out of hand, vaccine use did not contain the epidemic, and standard planning did not work. Thus a state health official sums up the deficiencies of response. Hospital resources have been overwhelmed, with people flooding emergency rooms in the belief they have smallpox. These cases are added to hospitalized cases before and during the epidemic; yet there are not even enough beds for all the sick. The hospital staff have become physically and emotionally exhausted from the long hours and from seeing about a third of infected patients die.
Failure of containment has turned the outbreak from local to national and international. However, the epidemic would have been much worse, had it gone unchecked, notes a state health official. Containment was significant. The 15,000 smallpox cases could have easily been more than 100,000.
No perpetrators have yet been identified, despite combining the criminal and the epidemiologic investigations. Such methodical work, however, is important because, unless the intelligence community comes up with information or a tip, there is no other way to identify the source of the epidemic, explains an FBI offical.
Many of the problems in the epidemic could have been avoided or controlled if extensive plans had existed, panelists agree. The panelist speaking from a governor's perspective identifies leadership as the most pressing void. Should the city have been placed under immediate quarantine? Should martial law have been implemented? Is the designation of a single smallpox hospital a reasonable thing for any city to do? These are difficult questions to face in the wake of a disaster. Such issues must be addressed long before trouble strikes.
The significant cost of curtailing the epidemic is debated. How will a smallpox hospital be financed, inquires a physician. The money might come from the federal government as emergency management funding, suggests a city emergency manager. The infrastructure and linkages within the public health community could be improved, the capacity for laboratory testing of samples could be increased, surveillance methods could be enhanced, and a health information strategy could be developed.
While the smallpox scenario
is certainly frightening, experience with earlier epidemics (smallpox among them),
knowledge of the issues, and expertise to deal with them show that in a crisis
people from all disciplines pull together.
Mr. Bardi is a freelance writer in Baltimore who holds degrees in biophysics and science writing from Johns Hopkins University.
Address for correspondence: Jason Bardi, Johns Hopkins University, Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, 111 Market Place, Ste. 850, Baltimore, MD 21202, USA; fax 410-223-1665; email@example.com.
What shall we do?
Try to find work which allows you to earn a living without interacting with people.
Find a home in the country NOW, not later, for millions will be heading for the country.
Arm yourself. Have firearms and sprays, such as ammonia. Guns may be outlawed. Think!
Learn any ploys you can use to get the vaccine unofficially. Can you get it in Mexico?
Be prepared to move to a part of the country where there is no epidemic.
Learn defensive measures now and how you will employment them.
Shop in the middle of the night. Use mail order for everything you can get.
Spray yourself and virtually everything you bring into your home with Lysol.
Use alcohol hand cleaners when outside the home.
Keep a supply of face masks and latex gloves on hand.
If you are shy about using precautions in public, you better go make arrangement at the local mortuary NOW. They will be rather busy later, and you could end up being dumped in a ditch for the coyotes to eat.
Stop shaking hands with people.
Do not attend public functions for any reason.
Do not attend a church which has no quarantine measure in place.
Lay in a supply of food.
Get a supply of water ahead.
Buy a second freezer and keep it full.
Plant a garden.
Do NOT buy vegies imported from anywhere.
Do not allow your pets to roam the neighborhood.
Home school your children (this may actually be forced on you by local officials, so get on with it).
Never eat out.
Don't stay in Motels.
Drive to destinations-- never use the airlines-- they do NOT filter the air in that plane.
As a family, sit down protocols for defending yourself.
Ask yourselves, "What will we do if someone in the family gets smallpox?"
Given all the smallpox now stocked in the world (20 tons in Russia alone), and given the millions of pathological people on this earth, you can count on it-- there WILL be a smallpox epidemic. You cannot hope for a solution by computer geeks, as we were rescued from Y2K peril. There is NO way to stop evil men from unleashing this epidemic, and they need to do so before about 2005, for by then, most of the White Race, who own all the debt on earth, will have restocked vaccines.
Just imagine all the nations today, hopelessly in eternal debt to the World Bank, who would be liberated by the collapse of the USA and Europe! What a motivation for about 90 national leaders to drop the vial.
You were warned.
OCTOBER 15, 2001
..........Dr. Osterholm last year wrote an excellent book entitled "Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe." (Delacorte Press 2000) I strongly recommend this concise but important book.
"Smallpox, the nightmare to end all nightmares that was eliminated as a natural disease in the 1970s, often starts with a simple fever -- the sort of thing anyone might get," Dr. Osterholm writes in the book. After a relatively long incubation period, it gets worse.
When I interviewed him Sunday, he pointed out that smallpox does kill about 30 percent of the people that contract it. In the United States today, he said, mostly everyone would be susceptible to smallpox since few people have received vaccinations since the 1970s. If you did receive a vaccination 30 years ago, it probably is no longer effective. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says: "Routine vaccination against smallpox ended in 1972. The level of immunity, if any, among persons who were vaccinated before 1972 is uncertain; therefore, these persons are assumed to be susceptible." The CDC has an informative site on small pox.
Unlike anthrax, smallpox can be transmitted by people who have contracted it. "So instead of having that first event be the end of it, like it is with anthrax where no one who becomes infected transmits this on, smallpox could be transmitted on," Dr. Osterholm told me.
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, a former law enforcement official who participated in the "Dark Winter" war game on bio-terrorism, is also an authority on the subject. He told me local and state health officials quickly need lots more training to deal with the threat of smallpox. He says the supply of vaccine needs to be increased right away.
"Don't let an individual in Washington say that doctors and nurses, for example, in Atlanta can't have them, they have to go some place else," Keating says. "We have to have a decision-making mechanism that's prompt."
Let's hope the threat of smallpox remains simply that -- a threat.
May 21, 2002-- The UK, the USA, and some developing nations have gone into high gear to produce smallpox vaccine. It would seem that a good portion of the US population could be vaccinated if there were an attack. The US Government has been very slow to make decisions to protect the people, and many Americans fear being vaccinated after seeing the results of recent vaccination programs in Desert Storm. So, I don't see much happening in this way until AFTER an attack and AFTER a lot of people die of biological agents. After that, the masses will beg for the vaccine, and a very ugly battle for the treatment could develop as the Feds try to determine who is worthy of saving. Sounds like grist for the mills of the antichrist, right?
YOU CAN READ WHAT CHANCE YOU HAVE
BEING VACCINATED DURING AN EPIDEMIC
EXAMPLE OF THE NEW AGE HEALTH NUTS TAKING CREDIT FOR
THE ERADICATING OF SMALLPOX BY THE OTHER BRANCH OF THE NEW AGE.
This shows how well you can trust these people to tell you the truth.
HAS INDEED BEEN USED IN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE..................
BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST AMERICAN INDIANS
HOW SMALLPOX ATTACKS A VIRGIN CULTURE, LIKE OURS TODAY
The viruses that make us: a role for endogenous retrovirus
in the evolution of placental species
by Luis P. Villarreal
The view that viruses are principally major agents of disease is richly deserved. In human history, viral epidemics have accounted for more human deaths than all known wars and famine combined. This especially evident in the new world following the introduction of smallpox, then measles, influenza, and mumps into the then naive native american population from Europe. In Europe, these disease had already established a childhood pattern of infection. Essentially all adult Europeans were literally the survivors of childhood infections with smallpox and measles.
Smallpox was particularly significant in New World demographics. The first epidemic on the mainland was to hit the Aztec population around the time of the infamous �noche triste� on June 20th 1520, killing all the leaders and many warriors of the Aztec revolt that expelled Cortez. This revolt, one that killed many of Cortez�s conquistadors and drove them from Tinochtitlan (the Aztec capital), was to ultimately fail in spite of the seemingly enormous numerical advantage of the Aztecs. This smallpox epidemic and resulting social chaos was to deliver a death blow to this numeric superiority and clear the way for the successful return Cortez and his allies the following year.
This and subsequent epidemics were to continue their inexorable march through the Inca and Mayan civilizations then later into the North and South American continents, including Indians from the Mississippi valley, the Eastern seaboard, then into California and the Columbia river valley resulting in the greatest demographic catastrophe in human history.
SMALLPOX-- NO CURE-- Prelude to Armageddon
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